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ABSTRACT
Since Hurricane Katrina, targeting redevelopment has become the dominant municipal
strategy for neighborhood and city-wide revitalization. Since 2009, this strategy has been
adopted and is currently being implemented by the New Orleans Redevelopment Authority in
several New Orleans neighborhoods. One such area includes the commercial corridor of the
Central City neighborhood, Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard (OC Haley).
This thesis describes and assesses NORA‘s strategy for revitalizing OC Haley with
regards to impacts on Central City‘s economic development and affordable housing—two of the
area‘s greatest challenges. Although NORA‘s targeting strategy is proving effective in many
respects, it is not without its limitations including creating a gentrifying environment. To
address this foreseeable impact, this thesis recommends the incorporation of a Community Land
Trust (CLT) into NORA‘s Central City Strategy to aid in effectively revitalizing the
neighborhood without compromising affordability.

KEYWORDS: Community development, Targeting, Gentrification, Community Land Trust,
New Orleans Redevelopment Authority.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE ISSUES
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Motivated by city-wide plans and local planning initiatives, the availability of funding,
and the impacts of

Fig. 1: Map of Neighborhoods in New Orleans

Hurricane Katrina, the
Oretha Castle Haley (OC
Haley) corridor and the
Central City neighborhood
are beginning to see
unprecedented activity and
investment—an area that
had long suffered from a
host of urban problems.
This thesis aims to identify the interests and their strategies influencing the recovery of the OC
Haley corridor and Central City, the progression that led to these interests, activities, and
investments, and how these are affecting the recovery of the area in question. From this general
overview, this thesis focuses in on the strategy and actions of the New Orleans Redevelopment
Authority (NORA). This thesis is framed by the following questions:


What revitalization efforts are currently taking place in the Central City
neighborhood and along the OC Haley corridor?



Who is working to realize this resulting vision and what strategy is being
employed?



How were these visions and strategies formed?

1



In what ways is the strategy succeeding and/or failing?



How can the failures or weaknesses of this strategy be addressed?

By answering these questions, this thesis will provide insight into the formulation and
1
implementation of recovery efforts in Central City community and offer recommendation with
regards to integrating and increasing the effectiveness of current recovery efforts. The lessons
gleaned from and the recommendations made within this thesis are intended to provide
organizations and individuals involved in community redevelopment, particularly in New
Orleans and in the Central City neighborhood, with a greater understanding of the possible
impacts of current revitalization efforts as well as highlight an additional method to mitigate
negative impacts of on-going initiatives and create a more holistic approach to aiding Central
City in its recovery.
INTRODUCTION TO CENTRAL CITY AND ORETHA CASTLE HALEY
The New Orleans neighborhood of Central City can be defined as the area bound by St.
Fig. 2: Map of Neighborhoods in District 2

Charles Avenue to the south, Louisiana
Avenue to the west, the Pontchartrain
Expressway to the east, and Toledano Street
and Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard to the
north. The neighborhood is approximately
two square miles and sits to the north of the
Garden and Lower Garden District, to the west
of the Central Business District, and to the east
of the Broadmoor neighborhood (see Figure
1). As its name suggests, Central City is

2

centrally located within the city of New Orleans. Historically, the Central City neighborhood
had been closely associated a variety of activities and uses, including commerce, public housing,
and African American culture. Central City has a varied and rich history full of times of
prosperity, times of distress and, more recently, times of revitalization.
HISTORY OF THE AREA: ORIGINS TO PRE-KATRINA
Beginning in the 1830‘s, the Central City neighborhood was developed largely as
speculative rental properties. By the late 1800s, 95% of the structures making up Central City
were rental-housing units.1 Although the demographics have shifted in Central City in terms of
the ethnic group dominating the area, it has historically been a working class stronghold. The
housing stock is overwhelmingly rental units made affordable for largely working class
residents. The demographic shifts the neighborhood has undergone over the years has included a
number of immigrant populations including German, Italian, Irish, and Jewish peoples, but has
been comprised of an African American majority since the 1930s.2 Over time, these populations
have largely and regularly served as domestics and skilled laborers for residents in the
historically wealthier and primarily American adjacent district, the Garden District.
Central City, like many neighborhoods, has a commercial corridor that has served as the
economic backbone of the community, Oretha Castle Haley Boulevard (OC Haley). OC Haley
begins where Dryades Street ends at Jackson Avenue and continues for ten blocks northwest
before ending at the Pontchartrain Expressway (see Figure 3). At its height in the 1940s and
1950s, the OC Haley corridor included over 200 businesses. The reason for OC Haley‘s
celebrated success as a commercial epicenter can be attributed to the time period of
institutionalized racial discrimination in which African Americans were not allowed and other
1

GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖ June 23, 2004.
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html>
2
GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖
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socially conscious consumers were

Fig. 3: Map of Parcels along OC Haley Corridor

unwilling to shop in historically white
commercial districts, namely Canal
Street bordering the French Quarter.3
The late 1960s marked the beginning of
OC Haley‘s decline as many
commercial areas were forced to
integrate and white flight sent customers
to the suburbs.4 With this decline in
commercial activity and integrated
population, several trends began to
emerge in the Central City area. Central
City saw increasing numbers of
minority residents and residents with
incomes at or below the poverty line. The area also began to see incidents of increased crime
and decreased property values. To help change the image of the area, Melpomene Street became
Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard in 1977 and OC Haley was given its current name, changing it
from Dryades Street, in 1989.5 Despite the attempts to reinvigorate the area, urban decline has
continued to plague OC Haley and the surrounding area into the 21st century.

3

GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖ June 23, 2004.
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html>
4
GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖ June 23, 2004.
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html>
5
Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 6.
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Fig. 4: Map of Percent of people living below twice the poverty
threshold by census block group in Orleans Parish

Fig. 5: Map of Percent African American Population by census
block group in Orleans Parish

5

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the OC Haley Corridor showed the typical signs of a
distressed inner-city neighborhood. Poverty, segregation, and lack of access to education,
transportation, and employment have been negatively affecting this Central City area before the
catastrophic storm in 2005. In 2000, Central City had a population of 19,702 people made up of
8,147 households, 4,016 of those households being families.6 This population was majority
African American (87.1%) with whites making up the largest minority population (9.9%) and
significantly smaller populations of Asian, Native American, Hispanics, and other categories (see
Fig. 4).7 The Central City was overwhelmingly African American and just as overwhelmingly
impoverished (see Fig. 5).
2000 Census data shows half of Central City households lived in poverty compared to
27.9% in Orleans Parish and 12.4% nationally.8 The average household income is about half that
of Orleans Parish ($23,237 compared to $43,176).9 The data also show that most households in
poverty are female householders with no husband present and with children under 18 (68.2% of
the Central City population compared with the 44.4% national figure).10 In addition, poverty
rates are higher across all age cohorts compared to their counterparts in the rest of Orleans
Parish, the state of Louisiana, and nation-wide.11 Related to its poverty, Central City suffers from
higher rates of unemployment and lower rates of educational attainment than the surrounding
parishes, the state, and the nation. It is fair to say that prior to any hardships caused by Hurricane
Katrina, Central City was a community suffering from issues of poverty, segregation, and

6

U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Full-count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org>
7
Census 2000 Full-count Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
8
U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org>
9
Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
10
Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
11
U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3). From a compilation by the GNO Community
Data Center. <http://www.gnocdc.org>
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inequity disproportionately compared to many other neighborhoods in New Orleans and
throughout the country (See Figure 3).
ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS: THE CENTRAL CITY RENAISSANCE ALLIANCE
Given the general state of Central City‘s population, the area is and has been for several
decades in need of both economic and social stabilization. These issues have been identified by
professionals outside of the community as well as by the community itself and have been
formally expressed in various planning documents. Disinvestment, concentrations of poverty,
proliferation of certain types of land uses, lack of recreational and green space, an absence of
needed stores and services, and inadequate after school programs for youth had become
characteristic of the Central City neighborhood.12 Efforts to address these concerns have
surfaced since OC Haley‘s early days of decline in the 1960s including the renaming of streets in
the 1970s and the formal assessing of the community‘s problems in the City of New Orleans
1999 Land Use Plan. These issues, were more clearly identified in a community planning
initiative that took place the year before Hurricane Katrina.
In its continued efforts to address the issues plaguing Central City, the City of New
Orleans commissioned a community planning initiative, the ―Central City Renaissance Alliance
Community Plan,‖ with support from the Ford Foundation, and spearheaded by Concordia
Planning, LLC (Concordia). Concordia representatives, local and national philanthropic
partners, over 200 residents, and municipal partners participated in this planning effort together,
forming the Central City Renaissance Alliance (CCRA). Working together for eighteen months,
the members of the CCRA participated in a communicative planning process that produced the
Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.13 The result of these efforts was a plan to

12
13

Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 8.
CCRA Website. <http://myccra.org/#/about-ccra/4530391365> Accessed February 10, 2010.
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―guide the City in delivering services and providing resources to address the community‘s
needs.‖14 This plan, given its focus on community participation and involvement and the time
period in which it was developed, provides a uniquely comprehensive and internal perspective on
the needs and goals of Central City. This concept is critical in considering plans conceived after
Hurricane Katrina and, in turn, in assessing the recovery of the neighborhood.
With citizen participation being an integral component of the committee-based approach
characterizing the methodology of the planning effort, the CCRA plan identified seven themes
that organize the policy recommendations and actions including: Strengthening Community
Connections, Telling the Community Story, Housing in the Community, Community
Beautification, Employing the Community and Community Wealth Building, An Educated
Community, and A Healthy and Safe Community.15 Although each theme deals with specific
sub-categories, many of the goals, actions, and recommendations within each theme directly
impacts housing and/or economic development. For example, the ―Strengthening Community
Connections‖ includes creating a database of community businesses and reorganizing businesses
to work cooperatively. In addition, a central goal in the ―Telling the Community Story‖ is
developing cultural tourism by building upon the history of the OC Haley corridor and the
traditions of the neighborhood.16 Housing and economic development are implicitly and
explicitly the focus of the CCRA‘s plan.
The main focus of the housing component of the CCRA plan includes managing
gentrification and improving the quantity of decent, affordable housing.17 The first of these
goals emerges from the concern that renewed economic interest and redevelopment of Central

14

Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 6.
Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 12.
16
Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Pages 12 and 21.
17
Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 24.
15
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City for middle and upper income families will create substantial price increases for housing and
price out existing residents. The plan also notes, however, that ―heightened demand for property
within the neighborhood lays the foundation for community revitalization‖ and ―demand for
retail and commercial enterprises improves the property tax base in the city.‖18 Thus, the task is
to maintain affordable housing and the current Central City population while simultaneously
encouraging investment and economic growth in the area. One recommendation made by the
CCRA to reduce the cost of homeownership and improve the sustainability of affordable housing
is establishing a community land trust (CLT).19 This tool will be discussed at greater length in
chapter four as the recommendation is still relevant today and may prove to fulfill the intended
purpose laid out in the CCRA‘s 2004 plan.
The other goal, to improve the quality of decent, affordable housing, is a response to a
housing stock that is suffering from neglect. In addition, the appearance of blighted homes and
businesses detracts from the economic viability of the area as well as the quality of life for
residents. To combat this neglect, the CCRA recommends the community cooperate with
volunteer organizations (such as Youth Build and AmeriCorps) already geared towards building
maintenance and blight remediation to complete interior and exterior building defects with
community members paying a fee that is subsidized by volunteer labor and financial support
from foundations and other philanthropic sources.20 Ultimately, housing that is both affordable
and of high-quality is an integral component in the CCRA‘s planning document as well as to the
overall recovery of the Central City neighborhood. Also integral to the neighborhood‘s
revitalization and the CCRA‘s plan is economic development.

18

Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 25.
Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 25.
20
Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 25.
19
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Three goals are identified under ―Employing the Community and Community Wealth
Building:‖ create a job resource center, improve access to financial services and resources, and
create an environment that supports new, small, and growing businesses.21 Additional goals
related to economic development are found throughout the CCRA planning document including
the already mentioned topic of reducing the appearance of blight as well as involving the
community in Brownfield redevelopment. None of the goals specifically discuss the OC Haley
corridor, neither in terms of how the goals will be implemented in the corridor nor how the
corridor could aid in realizing the goals. Instead, the goals are more general and applicable to
members of the community at-large rather than a specific area of the community. The CCRA
plan does make clear, however, that Central City‘s location, history, and local culture are all
assets for the area to draw upon for economic development opportunities. This theme as well as
the housing needs identified by the CCRA is found in a number of plans that have been written
since the CCRA‘s plan in response to Hurricane Katrina. The contents and commonalities of
these plans are discussed below. The purpose of this discussion is to identify generally the
intentions of planning efforts prior to Hurricane Katrina in Central City to provide some context
for the current activities taking place in Central City that effect these areas of recovery.
RECENT TRENDS: THE POST-KATRINA PICTURE
Painting a statistical picture of the Central City population post-Hurricane Katrina is
problematic due to the difficulty of collecting or obtaining accurate data in the wake of the 2005
disaster. Given what information is available, however, it appears there has been little change in
the Central City neighborhood with regards to residing population. Since Hurricane Katrina,

21

Concordia, LLC, et. al. ―Central City Renaissance Alliance Community Plan.‖ 2004. Page 37.
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Orleans Parish, as a whole, has become increasingly wealthy, white, and educated.22 However, it
is less likely that the Parish-wide demographic shifts affected Central City as significantly as
neighborhoods in which there were lower rates of returning residents given the neighborhoodlevel data that is available such as average household income which held at $26,826—
comparable to pre-Hurricane Katrina statistics.23 In addition, between 70 and 79% of Central
City residents are actively receiving mail at pre-Hurricane Katrina homes. 24 Given the
information available, Central City‘s current population shares characteristics similar to the
area‘s pre-Hurricane Katrina population making it likely that the current demographics of
Central City strongly resembles its 2000 demographics (see Appendices A-E). It follows that
the community faces similar issues prior to Hurricane Katrina.
Central City embodies a disproportionate numbers of poverty-stricken households and
suffers from the problems that have, unfortunately, become associated with and characterize
many inner-city neighborhoods. One major consequence for residents of poor urban
neighborhoods is that they become increasingly disconnected from the opportunities and general
prosperity of their larger metropolitan regions.25 The negative impacts do not become isolated to
these neighborhoods. In fact, strong disparities among neighborhoods affect the overall health of
metropolitan economics and ―lagging central cities act as a drag on the totality of regional

22

Plyer, Alison and Elaine Ortiz. ―Who lives in New Orleans and the Metro Area now?‖ Based on 2008 U.S.
Census Bureau Data. Greater New Orleans Community Data Center. Released: October 2, 2009, Pages 2 and 6.
23
Point 2 Homes. ―Demographics for Zip Code 70114.‖
<http://homes.point2.com/Neighborhood/US/Louisiana/Orleans-Parish/New-Orleans/Central-CityDemographics.aspx.> February 5, 2010.
24
Percent Recovery by Neighborhood in New Orleans, June 30, 2009, GNOCDC. GNO Community Data Center
analysis of Valassis Residential and Business Database.
View repopulation data by census block at www.gnocdc.org/repopulation/.
25
Krumholz, Norman. ―Metropolitan Development and Neighborhood Revitalization.‖ Revitalizing Urban
Neighborhoods. Keating, Dennis W., Norman Krumholz and Philip Star. University Press of Kansas: 1996. Page
214.
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economic growth.‖26 Given the interconnectedness of neighborhood and metropolitan wellbeing and the pervasiveness of this problem throughout Central City, it is crucial that this
neighborhood be stabilized and the methods used to achieve this end be carefully studied.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
The issue of affordable housing is not one specific to Central City, however, it has
arguably disproportionately affected this community. Central City‘s population and housing
stock is more vulnerable to the increases in housing costs post-Katrina.27 Despite the attention
given to the affordable housing issue in recent years and the strong economy during the 1990s,
the affordable housing crisis in the United States has only worsened—from 1991 to 1999, the
number of families paying more than 50 percent of their income for rent rose by 600,000, an
increase of 12 percent.28 By 1999, these ―worst case housing needs‖ renters totaled at least 4.9
million households, a record according to HUD. With the slowing of the economy and a rising
unemployment rate in the past 10 years, these figures have only worsened. According to the
National Housing Conference, more than 4 million working families lived in decent housing but
spent more than half of their income for rent or mortgages in 2001—representing a 30 percent
increase from 1999 and a 68 percent jump from 1997.29
Major changes in the economy and the population further complicate the affordable
housing challenge. Shifts in industry location and type are creating sprawling jobs, sprawling
housing patterns, redefining individuals‘ and families‘ housing needs, and creating stark
socioeconomic differences between regions and populations.30 Specifically, 2000 census data

26

Krumholz, Norman. ―Metropolitan Development and Neighborhood Revitalization.‖ Page 215.
GNOCDC, ―Central City Neighborhood Snapshot.‖ June 23, 2004.
<http://www.gnocdc.org/orleans/2/61/snapshot.html>
28
―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖ Page 2.
29
―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖ Page 2.
30
―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖ Page 2.
27
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confirms that the majority of job and housing growth is occurring in the Western and Southern
parts of the country as well as in the suburbs compared to the country‘s Midwestern,
Northeastern, and urban counterparts. In addition, suburbs are becoming increasingly populated
by minority groups, the result of increased African-American mobility in the 1990s, and are
generally inhabited by young singles and older Americans living alone versus the traditional
nuclear family, which is generally shrinking.31
The implications of these changes, with regards to affordable housing, is that the problem
must be considered in the context of current and future needs—not in a vacuum. Affordable
housing policies, programs, and incentives must, in turn, reflect these changes or be flexible with
regards to adjusting to them. Critics of current programs and other attempts to combat
affordable housing maintain that, ―across the nation, state and local government leaders and their
partners—in the corporate, civic, real estate, and nonprofit communities—are struggling to
implement an array of affordable housing and homeownership programs to better meet the needs
of low-income and working families.‖32 New Orleans does not escape this criticism and is
perhaps even more egregious in its inability to meet affordable housing needs.
New Orleans has undergone many changes in response to Hurricane Katrina in ways that
severely impact the supply and demand of the housing stock. In Post-Katrina New Orleans,
single-person households are on the rise (from 27 percent in 2000 to 31 percent in 2008).33
Along these lines, New Orleans also has fewer families with children (declining from 33 percent
of all households in 2000 to 27 percent in 2008).34 These statistics are consistent with research
that indicates that families with children are more likely to leave disaster-ravaged areas.
31

This

―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖ Page 2.
―Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 Years of Policy and Practice.‖ Page 1.
33
Plyer, Alison. et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Greater New Orleans
Community data Center and The Urban Institute. November 2009. Page 6.
34
Plyer, Alison, et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Page 6.
32
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newly emerging population has significant implications for the type, size, and location of
housing that is needed.
Occurring simultaneously with this shifting population is a change in home ownership
rates, which are increasing significantly across the metropolitan area (from 61 percent in 2000 to
67 percent in 2008).35 The comparison of these numbers to the number of households in New
Orleans suggests that homeowners are returning to the city in larger numbers than renters. The
GNOCDC report on housing production needs attributes this to the ―preponderance of federal
dollars allocated to rebuilding owner-occupied housing rather than rental housing.‖36 The
increase in homeownership continued despite rising housing costs. Rising housing costs for
renters, however, rose more than 3 times that of homeowners (27 percent) from 2004 to 2008.37
During this time, median gross monthly rent rose from $702 to $892.38 The 2008 increases are
well above comparable cities such as Baltimore, Memphis, or Milwaukee. The most
burdensome increases, according to the GNOCDC, were among renters earning $20,000 to
$35,000. Households with this annual income are considered low income and are often eligible
for subsidized low-income housing tax credit units (LIHTC units) to be discussed in greater
detail in Chapter 5.39
The importance of these figures is not solely to make the point that housing affordability
has been problematic for a portion of the New Orleans population following Katrina, but also
that the availability of affordable housing has and will continue to dictate the way in which New
Orleans recovers. Thus, the issue of affordable housing is central to the revitalization of New
Orleans, particularly neighborhoods that are vulnerable to shifts in the housing market. For this
35

Plyer, Alison, et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Page 7.
Plyer, Alison, et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Page 7.
37
Plyer, Alison, et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Page 7.
38
Plyer, Alison, et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Page 7.
39
Plyer, Alison. et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Page 9.
36
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reason it is important that the revitalization of Central City include some sustainable affordable
housing component, otherwise the neighborhood will never be revitalized.
HYPOTHESIS
NORA‘s strategy for redeveloping the OC Haley corridor, although influenced by a
series of planning initiatives started immediately prior to Hurricane Katrina on the neighborhood
planning level to city-wide post-Hurricane Katrina recovery plans, is directly tied to the city‘s
target area strategy. The NORA strategy is rooted in the theoretical community development
strategy of targeting. Although the effects of the strategy‘s implementation remain to be seen as
it is too early to make any definitive conclusions about overall effectiveness of NORA‘s
approach, there are some predictable outcomes based upon the historical context and makeup of
the neighborhood, the more general economic climate and policy frameworks, and the outcomes
of similar strategies already implemented and studied. The effect of the strategy of greatest
concern is that of gentrification.
Gentrification will signify both an improvement of the area as well as an inability to sustain
the current population. There are, however, many avenues for addressing this issue and
maintaining affordability for current and returning residents that should be strongly considered
by NORA in moving forward with their strategy. This recommendation is the establishment of
Community Land Trusts, a land use tool that is able to keep property values affordable through
ownership by an organization with a charitable purpose.40 By incorporating a mechanism for
maintaining affordability in the OC Haley corridor targeting strategy, NORA can achieve real
improvements for the area as well as ensure that current residents are recipients of those

40

Davis, John Emmeus. ―Starting a Community Land Trust: Organizational and Operational Choices.‖ Chicago:
April 2007. Page 2
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improvements by actively seeing that current residents are not displaced and have the option to
stay in the improving area.
NORA‘s strategy is in its early days of implementation and thus its outcomes are largely
unknown. It remains to be seen if the current projects will be completed, if completed projects
will have any enduring success, and what the impact will be on the community at-large.
Although this thesis attempts to predict the likely outcomes of implementing NORA‘s strategy
based upon the past implementation of similar strategies, the unique nature of New Orleans and
the post-Hurricane Katrina environment compound the difficulty of such an attempt. However,
NORA‘s strategy is one familiar to municipalities and communities across the country and its
theoretical origins and real-world implications have been thoroughly investigated and will be
heavily drawn upon to comment upon the future state of OC Haley and Central City as a result of
the actions of NORA. Although specific outcomes may not be reasonably predicted, general
impacts created by the NORA strategy and possible methods of mitigating undesirable impacts
are the limits of the research contained within this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2: STRATEGIES FOR REVITALIZATION
NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION: GENERAL PRINCIPALS AND PRACTICES
NORA‘s strategy, at its core, seeks to engage private interests in investing in an area.
NORA is strategically investing limited funds into a neighborhood through visible projects as a
means of stimulating the investment of additional, private monies. In addition, these projects are
aimed to serve both the interests of NORA as well as those of the neighborhood‘s residents.
With these constraints, NORA has carefully selected economic development projects along a
strategic corridor, OC Haley. NORA‘s strategy is not unusual. In fact, it is well-aligned to the
revitalization framework of the past decade: neoliberal communitarianism.
Neoliberal communitarianism is market-based and seeks shared interests between
residents of neighborhoods in need of revitalization and the larger society they exist within.41
The market-based component of this definition describes the neoliberal aspect of this framework
which, as described by Michael Porter, argues that ―a sustainable economic base can be created
in inner cities only as it has been elsewhere: through private, for-profit initiatives, and
investments based on economic self-interest and genuine competitive advantage.‖42 The
communitarianism component ―mirrors consensus-based organizing, in that the assumption is of
shared interests‖ to the extent in which it assumes that ―individual gains and interests in the
community are synonymous with collective, or community, gains and interests‖ and that
―communities are function of, and defined by, the attributes and relationship of people within
them.‖43
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Neoliberal communitarianism is descriptive of NORA‘s strategy in Central City and its
weaknesses can help explain the obstacles facing NORA. The weakness of neoliberal
communitarianism is that it does not allow for both the increased control of low-income residents
over their communities while also allowing for equitable improvement of low-income
communities.44 These outcomes are rooted in several breaks from the theoretical roots in
practice within both the neoliberal and communitarianism components of the framework. Within
neoliberal thinking the faulty assumptions are that the interests of capital are synonymous with
the interests of communities, that there is fair competition within capitalism when it has shown to
produce winners and losers, and that investment from the outside can be controlled by residents
inside the investment areas.45 These assumptions carry over to the communitarianism portion of
the framework. First, communitarianism assumes that ―individual gains and interests are the
same as those of the larger community,‖ that ―people in a community share common interests
simply by virtue of livening in the same area,‖ and that communities are ―products of the
attributes of the people within them.‖46 In sum, neoliberal communitarianism assumes that there
is no conflict between interests with regards to community revitalization. These assumptions
result in real obstacles and problems that arise with implementing a strategy rooted in neoliberal
communitarianism such as that of targeting, the strategy adopted by NORA.
TARGETING: ORIGINS, ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND LIMITATIONS
Targeting can generally be defined as the strategic investment of limited resources to
revitalize a specified geographic area.47 Typically, resources tend to be public monies and the
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specific geographic area is a distressed, low-income urban area.48 Galster et al. (2006) question
the ability of the targeting strategy to trigger the revitalization of struggling, inner-city
neighborhoods as they examine Richmond, Virginia‘s use of a spatially targeted Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) for revitalizing seven of the city‘s unstable neighborhoods.
The authors‘ question whether or not there is an investment threshold that will provide the right
conditions for qualitative neighborhood improvement. Using an adjusted interrupted time series
model, Galster et al. find targeting strategies can be effective in improving neighborhoods and
that there is a threshold of investment that will result in neighborhood improvement as measured
by increased property values.
The Richmond study holds both hope for targeting to prove effective in New Orleans as
well as the neighborhoods targeted in Richmond, like Central City, are described as distressed
with ―higher-than-citywide percentages of persons in poverty, female-headed households, and
vacant and renter-occupied property.‖49 The development authority in Richmond, like NORA,
primarily utilized CDBG money to ―achieve a critical mass that stimulates self-sustaining private
market activity.‖50

Galster et al. examined the effect of concentrated public spending on

property values within census tracts and revealed that investment that exceeds a medium
expenditure per census tract ($20,100) led to increased property values.51 This outcome is
lauded as a great success particularly given the minimal displacement of residents due to the
following factors specific to the targeted Richmond neighborhoods: ―(1) high initial vacancy
rates; (2) emphasis on infill construction, using vacant lots, and upgrading of dwellings by
incumbent owners; and (3) housing counseling provided through [a special municipal service
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implemented along with the targeting plan].‖52 Targeting, as Galster et al. demonstrate, can
revitalize neighborhoods, however, at a cost. This cost includes the initial funding needed to
improve the neighborhood (which is significant) as well as the cost that is passed along to current
residents in the form of increased property values and general cost of living. This secondary cost
provides an environment for gentrification.

GENTRIFICATION AND THE RE-EMERGENCE OF GENTRIFICATION
There is no consensus on the definition of gentrification. There is, however, general
agreement about the way in which this phenomenon manifests itself within a community. The
term was apparently coined by Ruth Glass in 1964:
One by one, many of the working-class quarters of London
have been invaded by the middle classes—upper and lower.
Shabby, modest mews and cottages—two room up and tow
down—have been taken over, when their leases have
expired, and have become elegant, expensive residences.
Larger Victorian houses, downgraded in an earlier or recent
period—which were used as lodging houses or were
otherwise in multiple occupation—have been upgraded
once again…Once this process of ―gentrification‖ starts in
a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original
working class occupiers are displaced and the whole social
character of the district is changed.53
Gentrification, for the purpose of this thesis, will refer to the development in lowerincome areas that results in a pattern of higher rents and land house values that cause the
displacement of existing renters and owner-occupiers by making the area unaffordable.
Gentrification will also include the definition specified by secondary displacement in which
public spending programs in one area attracts the eye of private market speculators and
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gentrifiers with the resultant displacement of the original residents.54 Generally the process of
gentrification is one in which a population residing in an area is pushed out by an increasing cost
of living and is replaced by a population that can afford to live in this appreciating environment.
This process is most often found to include the movement of lower-income minority populations
out of an area and a higher-income white and often younger population into the area.
A study of gentrification in Harlem revealed significant increases in per capita income
and median contract data in the 1980s—a distinct change in data from the prior decade.55 The
cause of the gentrification of Harlem is found to be increased investment in specific areas of the
neighborhood. In the 1980s, areas in Harlem were targeted by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) as a Neighborhood Strategy Area as well as by Harlem Urban
Development Corporation and other various City agencies for developing public housing and
local businesses. Projects initiated by these entities led to the multi-million dollar development
ventures in the private housing market.56 Although initial investments were aimed at lowerincome residents, the statistical demographic representative of the area, the investment spurred
by this targeted approach was intended to capture middle and upper-income citizens.57 As the
case of Harlem illustrates, gentrification is a concern not only for general investment in an area,
but must be taken into consideration even when investing for lower-income and presently
residing citizens is the focus of the targeting strategy.
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OTHER STRATEGIES: APPLICABILITY AND LESSONS LEARNED
Other strategies exist to effectively revitalize distressed urban areas with different effects
than those found in targeting. Plans that incorporate heavy community participation components
and plans that embrace the recommendation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders (Kerner Commission) and subsequent involvement of Community Development
Corporations (CDC) as well as incorporating community participation make up a few alternative
approaches that have had success in redeveloping struggling neighborhoods and whose lessons
can offer something to NORA in the way of increasing their effectiveness in Central City.
Specifically, revitalization efforts that consider the needs of the community in a holistically and
embrace the opinions and views of the community can prove effective in accomplishing
revitalization goals.
Community participation in which neighborhoods have decision-making authority is one
alternative method in which neighborhoods can be revitalized. Susan Fainstein and Clifford
Hirst found this to be the case in their 1995 study on the Neighborhood Revitalization Program
(NRP) in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In this case study, neighborhoods apply for NRP money
(made available through Tax Increment Financing) and, in turn, implement the programs,
incentives, or developments the neighborhood‘s community wants.58 Although this model
presents challenges with regards to competition between neighborhoods, unrepresentative
community representation, and parochialism, the model provides a balance between the need for
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economic investment and development and issues of neighborhood health, residential
affordability, and quality of life.59
Yet another strategy that can effectively revitalize urban neighborhoods is the
community-based approach. Such approaches, as defined by Norman Krumholz in his article,
―Metropolitan Development and Neighborhood Revitalization,‖ adhere to the guidelines
identified by the 1968 Kerner Commission as a foundation for bringing together viable
community-based organizations and led by a neighborhood advocacy organization or CDC.
Formed by the Johnson Administration to address the issues of race riots, the Kerner
Commission rejected the choice between ―empowering poor people and revitalizing distressed
places.‖60 Instead, the Kerner Commission found that both types of assistance are necessary to
truly improve urban neighborhoods and connect the inhabitants of distressed neighborhoods with
housing, jobs and opportunity. Krumholz argues for a neighborhood advocacy organization or
CDC as such entities are uniquely positioned to ―upgrade neighborhoods while protecting the
interest of low-income owners and renters.‖61 The implementing agency should then seek out
other organizations that
May also be the key to encouraging private neighborhood
investment and maintaining support for key institutional actors
whose decisions are vital to neighborhood revitalization. Such
institutions as hospitals, universities, banks, and other
commercial businesses can use their resources and institutional
power to sway governmental decisions, bolster the real estate
market, and create neighborhood confidence. 62
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The power of bringing together these various institutions, Krumholz argues, is that their
combined forces can help improve not only the quality of life within the defined area, but
actually aid residents in gaining greater control over the direction of their community and their
place within it. In this way, both the neighborhood and the residing citizens experience the
benefits of revitalization efforts. NORA‘s strategy could benefit greatly by embracing the
ideological underpinning separating the Kerner Report from previous understandings of urban
development. Specifically, NORA‘s strategy is a place-based strategy, focusing on the physical
improvements of the area. Given the concern of affordability and gentrification, NORA could
embrace additional place-based strategies that are aimed at a specific population—namely
affordable housing for current low-income residents. Affordable housing is not only a current
concern for New Orleans‘s residents, particularly low-income residents, but is an issue that will
only become increasingly problematic in Central City given the nature of targeting strategies to
increase property values.
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CHAPTER 3: THE NORA APPROACH
THE HISTORY OF NORA AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OC HALEY STRATEGY
The New Orleans Redevelopment Authority, originally named the Community
Improvement Agency (CIA), was created through state enabling legislation in 1968 with the
passage of the Community Improvement Act of 1968.63 The agency was created to address
issues of abandonment and blight in the city of New Orleans. Although the CIA was intended to
be an organization free from political influences and significant oversight with regards to urban
revitalization efforts in New Orleans, the CIA was a largely ineffectual agency—its budget was
limited, its leadership was controlled by the mayor‘s office, and its authority dependent upon the
support of the City Council.
The CIA was formed under Mayor Victor Schiro. Schiro advocated for the creation of
the CIA and convinced City Hall to support it by assuring City Council members that the
agency‘s ―decision-making powers rested largely with officials at City Hall.‖64 Schiro had the
authority to appoint the CIA‘s seven-member board and ―stacked it with political insiders, rising
black leaders, and businessmen with heavy investments in New Orleans real estate.‖65 This
board, all men, all had ties to either development, construction, or the populous black areas. In
this way, the CIA had become a tool of the mayor that would provide an avenue for gaining
support from black voters with relatively little financial or political costs. With oversight from
City Hall and the mayor‘s office as well as divided interest amongst board members, the CIA
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was limited in becoming a major player in the redevelopment process of New Orleans‘
neighborhoods. By 1972, the CIA had ownership of sixty properties (largely located in the
Lower Ninth Ward), had a staff of five people, and was mostly counseling homeowners about
how to rehabilitate their homes.66 Although Urban Renewal money and projects were underway
during this time in New Orleans, the CIA was playing a very minor role in the decision-making
or implementing of Urban Renewal plans.
In 1984, the CIA gained the authority of expropriation.67 Under Mayor Marc Morial‘s
administration, the CIA was the focus of restructuring. During this period of restructuring the
agency became known by its current name and, although struggling to receive funding and
influence, its tools for blight remediation were enhanced including an expedited process for
blight determinations and improved code enforcement. By 2001, NORA had established itself
as an effective and independent agency and had gained credibility as seen in its budget increases
from $400,000 in 1999 to $850,000 by 2001. NORA‘s developing finances and authority have
continued to grow as has its interconnectedness with City Hall.
In 2001, NORA began to use its right of reversion under its new Real Estate Acquisition and
Land-banking Mechanism (REALM) program. The idea motivating the creation of the program
was that NORA would be able to actively spur development in areas deemed less-desirable to
private interests. The REALM program would focus on three neighborhoods: Central City, St.
Roch, and the Lower 9th Ward. NORA ran into immediate issues. Budget shortfalls, an
evaluation of the program by incoming mayor Ray Nagin, and, slightly later, Hurricane Katrina
all slowed and eventually put a stoppage to the programs. These issues are symptomatic of the
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larger issues that have plagued NORA prior to Hurricane Katrina. In 2005, prior to the storm,
NORA‘s staff included only five employees. In addition, NORA was a relatively passive agency
only acting when a citizen or private interest would engage the agency about a particular
property or groups of properties.68 Although NORA‘s efforts to revitalize the identified
distressed neighborhoods had taken a backseat in the years immediately prior to Hurricane
Katrina, since Hurricane Katrina, NORA has began to reestablish itself and its agenda. This has
been due to, in part, the various plans that have developed since the storm.
Since Hurricane Katrina, numerous plans have been developed across the city from a variety
of interest groups that affect Central City and the OC Haley corridor including: the Bring New
Orleans Back plan (BNOB), the Lambert Plan, the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP), and the
Office of Recovery Management Target Area Plans (Target Plan). These plans, unlike the
CCRA, are aimed at the recovery of the neighborhood in response to Hurricane Katrina and not
the pre-Katrina conditions of the area. Plans formed after Hurricane Katrina also vary with
regards to community input, compared to the CCRA plan as well as to each other. All of these
plans, however, utilize targeting strategies as a means for revitalizing the Central City
community. Specifically, The BNOB plan proposed a systemic shrinking of the city‘s footprint
to focus development based upon two designating criteria: immediate opportunity areas and
neighborhood planning areas. The first being areas to which residents could immediately return
and begin rebuilding the city in the neighborhood model the BNOB plan recommends, the other
being areas in which recovery may not occur to the extent that the area would be returned to its
pre-Katrina state or that it would even be inhabitable.69 The Lambert Plan for Central City
Neighborhood Planning District 2 Rebuilding Plan provided the basis, along with similar plans
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for forty-nine other neighborhoods in New Orleans, for the UNOP plan. On June 25, 2006, the
Louisiana Recovery Authority unanimously accepted the UNOP as the basis for city recovery—
allowing the plan to be eligible for federal grants to enable implementation.70 With regards to
Central City, the plan emphasizes the need to provide quality, affordable housing as well as
capitalize on the area‘s proximity to the Central Business District and the Garden District and
historically and culturally significant assets to encourage economic development—echoing the
goals of the CCRA plan.71
The Lambert Plan provides even more specific economic development recommendations
that focus on the OC Haley corridor as a ―catalyst for economic growth and cultural education‖
and taking advantage of being formally accepted as a Main Street project.72 The strong promise
for OC Haley held in the Lambert Plan does not quite carry over to the UNOP plan as economic
development recommendations effecting the corridor are rated low and moderate in terms of
their recovery value. These projects, respectively, include the expansion of the Arts District and
the Commercial Corridor Revitalization Program.73 These plans all identify the need for
economic development in Central City and all, to varying degrees, recommend the focused
investment of resources. None of these plans have been directly implemented in the area, but
their influences are felt as these plans have provided the background and progression to NORA‘s
actions along OC Haley and in Central City.
During the formulation of the plans discussed above, NORA was identified as a possible
authority to spearhead the redevelopment of New Orleans as the agency held unique powers of
expropriation, to issue bonds, and to buy and sell property.
70
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With the creation of the Road Home Program (RHP) in
2006, state lawmakers were looking for local agencies—
particularly in devastated New Orleans—with the ability
to absorb the expected influence of state-owned
properties.74
Despite the early insights that NORA may lead recovery efforts in New Orleans, the
mayor‘s office was ultimately the lead agency. Mayor Nagin‘s recovery czar, Edward Blakely,
streamlined recovery efforts within City Hall and established the designation of recovery ―target
area‖ around the city. The strategy behind the ORM‘s Target Areas plan, as described by
Blakely is that "the

Fig. 6: Map of Target Recovery Area Plan

development zones will spur
activity from investors. When
one area starts to do well,
investors will want to invest
nearby. This will allow the city
to redevelop wisely and will
help residents make smart
choices about where to
rebuild."75 Target Areas have
been organized into three categories defining different kinds of recovery: Re-Build, Re-Develop,
and Re-New. The OC Haley corridor has been designated a Re-New district. Re-New Districts
refer to areas that call for aid with specific projects and ―that require relatively modest public
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intervention in order to supplement work already underway by the private and nonprofit
sector.‖76

Fig. 7: Map of Housing Opportunity Zones

The shared interest in
Central City expressed in the
ORM‘s Target Recovery Area
plan and NORA‘s OC Haley
revitalization strategy is no
coincidence. In September of
2008, in an attempt to smooth
over some of the differences
between NORA and City Hall,
Blakely negotiated a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA) between the two entities in which
residential neighborhoods surrounding the commercial target areas, Hosing Opportunity Zones,
would be given preference for NORA and city housing programs.77
In the years immediately following Hurricane Katrina, NORA was changing drastically
from the small, passive, and largely unknown entity into a large and growing effective
redevelopment authority. NORA‘s staff now includes over forty members, has title to over
10,000 properties, and has been the recipient of tens of millions of dollars in state and federal
grants.78 NORA actively seeks end-users for properties, creates interest in distressed
neighborhoods, and executes redevelopment plans the agency has created. The change NORA
has undergone is significant, but the agency is still sensitive to the authority of City Hall and the
76
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City Council as NORA faces tremendous pressure to maintain the credibility it has achieved.
NORA‘s strategy in Central City illustrates the careful balance NORA is seeking to achieve
between revitalizing an area without overstepping perceived boundaries of authority.

ON THE GROUND: ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION
NORA‘s strategy for Central City includes two distinct components: facilitating
commercial revitalization along the OC Haley corridor and reducing residential blight
throughout Central City. 79 The basis of

Fig. 8: Map of parcels for projects selected for NORA target strategy

NORA‘s strategy is the general idea that
public resources can be directed and
leveraged to trigger private investment and,
in turn, revitalize neighborhoods. NORA is
in a unique position to have access to such
resources and the authority to determine
where and to whom such resources should
be directed—within the framework set forth
by the city. As a result, NORA has
developed a plan to revitalize the Central
City neighborhood by focusing on the
economic development of the
neighborhood‘s main commercial corridor, OC Haley. Through the use of CDBG funds, NORA
has a budget of at least $2,000,000 for the specific use of commercial development along the OC
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Haley corridor.80 NORA had set up an application process for individuals to receive grant
money, revolving loans, and low interest loans to develop a commercial property along the
corridor. Applications were due in February of 2009. According to NORA Project Manager
Sam Saia, ―The application process is completed and the final financing is wrapping up for
ground to break in the coming months.‖81
NORA has selected fourteen projects along the OC Haley corridor to execute its targeting
strategy. The commercial entities include restaurants, various creative arts uses, demographicspecific housing, and retail. The criteria for selecting applicants rested largely from the financial
viability of the project and whether the project was deemed to be a positive contribution to the
community and current businesses. In essence, projects with unsecured or minimal sources of
funding as well as projects that included end uses that were considered undesirable community
businesses were less likely to be selected.82 The geographic clustering of selected projects can
be seen in Figure 10.
Each project will receive between $100,000 and $500,00083 to assist with acquisition,
architecture and engineering, and public facility improvements.84 The money provided by
NORA is intended to be used as filler for a funding gap, not the main source of funding as
projects should be considered viable without the added NORA assistance. A detailed table
communicating the specific business, funding amount, and address can be found below
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Fig. 9: Table of projects selected for NORA OC Haley targeting strategy

Project85
Bennett Café
Bennachin Restaurant
Restaurant, Jazz Club, and Bar
Coffee Shop
Ashe‘ Art Park
Live Performing Arts Venue, Restaurant
and Bar
Johnson Burkett Senior Housing
Cooperative and Mixed Use Facility
Café Reconcile
Masonic Temple Renovation
Retail and Goodwork Network
Headquarters
National Performance Network
Retail and Mixed Use Facility
Commercial Space and NORA
Headquarters
Mixed Use Facility

Address

Funding from
NORA
1626-1628 OC Haley Blvd. $500,000
1817 OC Haley Blvd.
$100,000
1332 OC Haley Blvd.
$250,000
1618 OC Haley Blvd.
$100,000
1712 OC Haley Blvd.
$349,685
1427 OC Haley Blvd.
**Financial
package
undetermined.
1626-1628 OC Haley Blvd. $500,000
1631 OC Haley Blvd.
1421 OC Haley Blvd.
2016 OC Haley Blvd.

$500,000
**Financial
package
undetermined.
$150,000

1436 OC Haley Blvd.

**Financial
package
undetermined.
1613-1617 OC Haley Blvd. $250,000
1610 OC Haley Blvd.
$250,000
1400 OC Haley Blvd.

$500,000

The overall investment from NORA into the OC Haley Corridor is tentatively well over
$3,000,000—above the budget initially indicated as part of the general application information.
Although each financial package is specific to the project, most projects are receiving low
interest revolving loans. This financing mechanism will allow NORA to recuperate its funding
over time in order to be able to continually invest and reinvest in projects along the corridor
eventually building a critical mass and providing a strong economic base for the corridor to
become self-sustaining.86
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NORA‘s initial financial commitment is likely to spur revitalization in the Central City
neighborhood. Given Galster et. al.‘s (1996) assessment of effective thresholds of funding
(investment that exceeds a medium expenditure per census tract, e.g. $20,100 in the Richmond,
Virginia case study),87 NORA‘s investment is well above that threshold and as such has provided
the economic catalyst to see real improvements in the neighborhood such as those measured in
the Richmond study (e.g. increased property values). NORA‘s target area includes six census
tracts within Orleans Parish (67, 68, 79, 80, 84, and 85) and investment is anticipated to be
beyond the initially designated two million dollars, bringing the average expenditure per census
track to over $300,000 as a low projection.88 Unlike the Richmond example, however, it is not
clear that the tangible benefits such as increased property values would not have some negative
effects on the current population residing within the targeted area. Although the OC Haley and
Central City neighborhood and the NORA strategy share some of the qualities that minimized
the encroachment and impacts of gentrification, the current NORA strategy is vulnerable to the
proliferation and adverse effects of gentrification because there is little in the strategy to actively
combat this secondary effect.
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ON THE GROUND: AFFORDABLE HOUSING
NORA‘s interests and activities are not limited to the OC Haley corridor nor is NORA
the only entity investing in the area. Although NORA is not acting alone and is not investing in
the OC Haley corridor as if it is an isolated entity, there is still a concern of future affordability
given the trend of

Fig. 10: Map of Investments in Central City

targeting to have on
communities. The
additional investment
is, in fact, geared
towards housing and, in
many cases, affordable
housing. In most cases,
NORA is partnering
with non- and for-profit
entities to produce
projects that incorporate affordable housing. NORA has formed partnerships with the City of
New Orleans, Gulf Coast Housing Partnership (GCHP), and Jericho Road Episcopal Housing
Initiative (Jericho Road) (see Figure 10).89
NORA‘s partnerships are designed to curb gentrification and provide affordable housing
options to residents. However, these partnerships must also consider the need to produce profits
for the partnering organizations. In the case of Jericho Road, a non-profit faith-based community
rehabilitation organization, NORA is providing funding to Jericho Road developers to be, in
turn, improved and sold for homeownership to buyers that agree to reside in the property for at
89
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least 5 years and have a family income equal or less than 30% of Area Median Income (AMI).
Jericho Road has completed development on 55 affordable-housing properties in Central City
and has begun another housing development to be completed in the next seven months. This
housing project, however, will only be one third affordable housing. The remaining two thirds
will be split equally between subsidized units and market rate units.90
NORA‘s largest partnership is with GCHP. GCHP is a non-profit development
organization that focuses on affordable housing. GCHP funding is largely provided by Housing
Partnership Network and Enterprise Community Partners and through partners on a projectbased level.91 These organizations have been major recipients of federal and state monies for
redevelopment. On the OC Haley Corridor, NORA has partnered with GCHP in the
development of a restaurant, GCHP‘s and the Neighborhood Development Foundation (NDF)
headquarters, several commercial units, and a mixed income/mixed use building including a
residential component for senior citizens.92
Outside of NORA, GCHP has pursued several residential ventures in Central City
including the Venus Garden Apartments and the Muses Apartment Homes. The Venus Garden
Apartments include 30 loft-style apartments. Although initially sold at market rate, in late 2009,
the units that did not sell were made available at affordable rates to local and visiting artists.93
The Muses Apartment Homes are nearing the end of the first phase of construction. When
completed, this mixed-use project will offer a variety of amenities to the tenants filling the 263
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units, 35% of which will be affordable housing units made available to ―qualified working
families and singles.‖94
NORA‘s independent efforts in residential areas are aimed at both reducing blight
and providing affordable housing through the organization‘s Lot Next Door and Real Estate and
Land-Banking Mechanism (REALM). The Lot Next Door program allows residents to purchase
a NORA-owned property that is located immediately adjacent to a currently owned property.95
Data is not available as to the number of properties that have been sold under this program in
Central City. However, the program falls outside the issue of affordable housing as the
properties are market rates and are available only to current home-owners, both requirements are
uncharacteristic of individuals qualifying for affordable housing. Under the REALM Program,
NORA can ―expropriate clusters of blighted
properties on its own in

Fig. 11: Map of selling clusters showing Recovery Target Areas
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non-profit developers for low- and moderate-income housing.‖96 As of April of 2009, NORA
had secured 75 properties in Central City under the REALM program with the number growing
everyday as properties complete the expropriation process.97
ASSESSING THE IMPACTS: LIKELY OUTCOMES AND FORESEEABLE ISSUES
NORA is attempting to generate a renaissance for Central City. NORA‘s strategy is
rooted in focusing investment to create additional investment from other sources, private and
public. NORA‘s unique authority and capacity to ―implement comprehensive neighborhood
revitalization plans‖ put a myriad of pressures on the organization.98 These pressures are
frequently at odds, as is the case between economic development and affordable housing as
NORA‘s strategy indicates. NORA‘s strategy is an attempt to balance these pressures: to
revitalize the neighborhood without neglecting affordability, to provide affordability without
neglecting the need to provide economic development with an adequate tax base.99
This balance is difficult to strike and there is preliminary evidence that affordability is
already suffering. Preliminary evidence of this includes the increased price of commercial
property values has increased from $8-9 per square foot to $14-15 per square foot since 2007.100
The redevelopment of the C.J. Peete public housing project also illustrates this point as the
number of affordable units has substantially decreased and the types of housing units have
diversified from 723 units to 410 units (154 public housing; 133 tax credit/mixed income; 123
market).101 This is also made evident, in part, by the need to decrease the affordable housing
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components of new residential developments as seen in the Venus Garden Apartments and
Muses Apartment Homes. Although NORA is not responsible for the loss of affordable housing
in Central City, however, given the need, NORA should respond with greater emphasis on the
affordable housing component of its revitalization strategy. One such effort, given NORA‘s
unique authority and capacity, could be the formation of a community land trust.
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CHAPTER 4: ADDRESSING THE AFFORDABILITY ISSUE
CURRENT OPTIONS
Ideally, the housing market would respond to the needs of all consumers seeking housing.
However, too often, the housing market seeks out the greatest profit and, in turn, focuses on
producing housing that is the most lucrative—not affordable housing. Thus the housing market
requires intervention. These interventions can be grouped into three distinct categories: rental
assistance programs, homeownership assistance programs, and land use and regulatory
initiatives. The categories vary in terms of the source from which the housing is provided (the
public or private sphere) and the intended recipient of the incentive (the person in need of
affordable housing or the person providing the affordable housing).
Rental assistance program take two basic forms: supply-side rental programs and
demand-side rental programs. Supply-side rental programs focus on producing and maintaining
housing units that are designated for occupancy by low and moderate-income households.
Examples include the public housing program (housing projects built and owned by the
government), LIHTC units, and grants and low-interest loans that encourage nonprofits and the
private sector to build or rehabilitate affordable rental housing.102 Demand-side rental programs
focus on directly aiding households in affording decent rental housing. Examples include
housing vouchers, short-term assistance to households threatened with eviction, and services that
help low-income renters search for and find affordable housing in the private sector. Targeted
social services associated with providing housing to serve residents with special needs (e.g.
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homeless people, senior citizens, and people with disabilities) may also be included in demandside programs.103
Homeownership assistance programs can be oriented to both supply-side and demandside approaches. These programs are aimed to expand access to homeownership.104 Specific
programs include subsidizing the production, improvement, or rehabilitation of for-sale housing
units as well as low-interest loans, counseling, and down payment assistance. Federal
government programs focus on demand-side initiatives in which homeownership is made more
affordable, accessible, and attractive to potential home buyers.
Land use and regulatory initiatives, although quite different from rental and
homeownership assistance programs, are potentially more effective at providing long-term
affordability and impactful with regards to affecting the largest supplier of housing: the private
sector. This is because land use and regulatory initiatives work to curb the behavior of the
private market in terms of location, characteristics, and costs.105 Examples include the creative
use of building codes, ―fair share‖ plans in which new, large residential development must
include an affordable housing component, inclusionary zoning regulations, growth controls,
smart growth policies, and land banking.106 The last of these, land banking, holds particular
promise of improving the affordable housing stock in New Orleans.
New Orleans utilizes all categories of affordable housing tools, but not with the same
regularity, frequency, or intensity as compared to each other. The Bureau of Government
Research (BGR) has identified and defined the types of affordable housing programs available to
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New Orleanians,107 The implementation of the programs described above in New Orleans has
largely been left to the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO). HANO was a large, deeply
troubled housing authority with 8,421 public housing units (79 percent of which were in just nine
very large projects) and 9,560 vouchers. According to U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development figures, 47 percent of HANO‘s public housing units were vacant in 2005 preKatrina. For more than 30 years, HUD had rated HANO as one of the country‘s worstperforming housing authorities and the agency was under HUD receivership at the time of the
hurricane.108 HANO had allowed decades of neglect and mismanagement to take their toll on
New Orleans‘s public housing stock leaving them in severe distress. The failure of HANO is in
part due to the city historically citing public housing projects in low-income neighborhoods,
isolating low-income residents from the rest of the city and exacerbating both racial and
economic segregation creating pockets of African American, urban, poverty—not unlike what
has played out in cities across the United States.
The current programs and incentives for providing affordable housing are not adequate in
meeting current affordable housing needs. The GNOCDC predicts, given a continuation of the
current housing trends in New Orleans, that in 2012, there will be a surplus of market rate units
of 4,156 and a 15,280 shortfall in affordable housing subsidies.109 Given the interconnectedness
of the city‘s recovery, affordable housing, and residents returning home, alternatives must be
aggressively explored and seriously considered. One alternative method that has appeared in
New Orleans‘s past and has proven effective in other cities is the creation of a land trust
synonymous with a land bank.
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Affordable housing is a relationship between housing and people. The goals surrounding
affordable housing need to be aimed at maintaining a healthy, sustainable relationship between
its components. In keeping with this overarching concept and taking into consideration the
economic climate, affordable housing should be oriented for long term affordability in desirable
areas, require high-quality construction and design, meet local and regional demands, and be
integrated with other development and housing. Current affordable housing programs and
policies address some of these concerns, but none are poised to address all of them. There is no
silver bullet to combat the lack of affordable housing or the growing need for affordable housing.
However, land banking potentially can address a number of the goals affordable housing should
be meeting and could be particularly effective in addressing the affordable housing problem in
New Orleans.
COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS: ONE MITIGATING STRATEGY
The rising cost of housing is both a symptom and source of gentrification as it ―locally
intensifies the growing [affordable housing] crisis in [the United States] and has become
significantly worse in the past ten years.‖110 Although increased property values can be viewed
as beneficial for a community, it is not always beneficial to the people that first resided within a
gentrifying community as it can make the area unaffordable for this population. Collective
ownership is one response to gentrification as it addresses the underlying causes and greatest
criticism of gentrification: bringing control over the community to those who live within it
through ownership. There are several forms of collective ownership including Limited Equity
Housing Cooperatives, Mutual Housing Associations, and the recommendation of this thesis to
address the affordable housing issue in Central City, Community Land Trusts (CLTs).
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HUD defines a land trust or land bank as a governmental or nongovernmental nonprofit
entity that focuses on the conversion of vacant, abandoned properties into productive uses.111
Community land trusts expand upon this basic function to include a greater intended purpose of
land trusts which embrace a focus other than that of maximizing profits, such as for providing a
community with affordable housing.112 In the specific case of creating a land trust for the
expressed purpose of creating affordable housing units, a group is formed, usually a nonprofit
entity, that will provide the organizational structure to hold the land in trust and execute the land
trust‘s purpose. The group then acquires several parcels of land in a targeted geographic are the
land or buildings erected in the future are sold to another party. The building‘s buyer may be an
individual homeowner, a cooperative housing corporation, a nonprofit organization or limited
partnership developing rental housing, or any other nonprofit, governmental, or for-profit
entity.113 The owner of any building on the land is given exclusive use of that land through the
use of inheritable ground leases that typically extend for 99 years.114 The dual-ownership
enables ―the landowner (the CLT) and a building‘s owner protect the latter‘s interests in security,
privacy, legacy, and equity, while enforcing the CLT‘s interests in preserving the appropriate
use, structural integrity, and continuing affordability of any buildings located upon its land.‖115
Affordability is maintained even if the owner of a building decides to sell his/her
structure.
This is made possible through a formula included in the ground
lease to calculate the value of the building. Designed to give
present homeowners a fair return on their investment, while giving
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future homebuyers fair access to housing at an affordable price. By
design and by intent, the CLT is committed to preserving the
affordability of housing (and other structures) – one owner after
another, one generation after another, in perpetuity.116
Also, the CLT can reserve the right of first refusal should a leaseholder decide to sell
their unit.117 In addition to securing affordability, the CLT also takes measures to secure the
integrity of the physical and financial integrity of the structure. The ground lease requires the
owner to occupy the structure and maintain ―responsible use of the premises.‖ 118 The CLT
maintains the right to step in and force improvements on any building that falls into disrepair.
The CLT can also interfere should property owners default on their mortgages, forestalling
foreclosure and maintaining the initial terms of the lease.119 The CLT provides the necessary
safeguards to maintain affordability without compromising structural integrity, quality, or
financing. Although successful CLTs have clear and impactful benefits, creating a successful
CLT is complicated and the process must tackle numerous obstacles.
According to the National Community Land Trust Network, creating a land trust follows
the general pattern of developing a rationale, identifying sponsorship, defining a service area,
developing an organization to hold the land , deciding on a housing development strategy, and
securing funding. Each of these steps is described briefly in the table below and elaborated on
with regards to the specific case of NORA and Central City in a later subsection.
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Fig. 12: Table of Steps to Form a CLT

Step
Rational

Sponsorship
Service Area

Organization
and Education

Development

Funding

120

Definition120
Balance, as defined by the specific goals of the CLT, between the individual
and community benefits created from the dual-ownership model. This
balance can be aimed at a variety of goals. Examples of what balance may
look like for specific CLTs include: Developing communities without
displacing people; Retaining the public‘s investment in affordable housing;
Perpetuating the affordability of privately owned housing
The entity that provides the impetus for a new CLT and plays the leading
role in getting it organized. Sponsorship can come from grassroots activists,
public officials, other nonprofit organizations, or private employers.
CLTs are place-based organizations. They develop their projects and draw
their members from a community that is geographically defined. This service
area may be small or large, urban or rural. It may encompass a single
neighborhood, several neighborhoods, an entire city, an entire county, or, in
a few cases, a multi-county region.
Building and educating the base that will support the CLT. Key
constituencies include: (1) the community of individuals and institutions
that call the CLT‘s service area their home; (2) nonprofit organizations
serving the same population as the CLT; (3) governmental agencies to whom
the CLT must look for project funding, regulatory approvals, and equitable
taxation; (4) private lenders and donors on whom the CLT must depend for
mortgage financing and operating support; and (5) housing professionals on
whom the CLT must depend for legal advice, accurate appraisals and
development expertise. Three strategies of where to start organizing and
educating these groups include Community organizing, Core Group
organizing, and Resource organizing.
The strategy implemented to bring land and housing into their pricerestricted domain of permanent affordability. Several strategies exist
including: CLT-initiated development, Buyer-initiated acquisition,
Developer-initiated projects, Stewardship programs with partners doing all
development, Municipally-initiated projects, municipally-mandated units
(inclusionary housing), and PHA-divested housing.
CLTs need funding for project and operational costs. Successful CLTs take
at least three years to become financially sustainable. Project funds are
needed for: land acquisition, pre-development feasibility, architectural
design, site preparation, infrastructure development, construction of
residential (or commercial) structures, rehabilitation of residential (or
commercial) structures, down-payment assistance for first-time homebuyers,
and permanent financing for first-time homebuyers or for the nonprofit (or
for-profit) buyers of residential or commercial structures on leased land.
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CASE STUDIES: BURLINGTON, VERMONT and ESCAMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA
Although the benefits of successful CLTs are numerous and well-aligned to the mission
of NORA and needs of Central City, CLTs can have mixed success. The Burlington Community
Land Trust (BCLT) illustrates the positive impact communal ownership can have on rising
property values while the Escambia County Community Land Trust (ECCLT) illustrates the
inability for a land trust to navigate the obstacles that arise in organizing, funding, and operating
a CLT.
The BCLT is perhaps the most well-known and successful land trust in the United States.
In the 1980s, the cost of renting and owning housing was growing about twice as fast as average
incomes in Burlington, Vermont. This rapid growth coupled with a city government brought into
power by affordable-housing advocates provided the context for the creation of the BCLT. In
1984, focused on preserving affordable housing in Burlington‘s rapidly gentrifying North End
District and community development, the BCLT was incorporated. The newly incorporated land
trust received funding through the city government and through CDBG funds as well as through
some creative funding sources such as the Burlington Employees Retirement System.121 The
BCLT embraced the standard governing organization represented by one-third leaseholders, onethird representatives from community organizations, and one-third at-large community members.
The board is elected by the membership which includes all leaseholders and anyone from the atlarge community that pays the $1 membership fee.122
The BCLT is meeting its goals of developing an area and maintaining affordability. As
of 2004, the BCLT had about 500 units of housing on its land, half being owner-occupied and
half rental or mutual housing. In addition, the BLCT had grown the uses of its land to include
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community centers, family emergency centers, special needs housing, and single-roomoccupancy (SRO) housing for single people with very low incomes—providing not just housing,
but job opportunities and goods and services to support this community.123 Although the BCLT
continues to grow in size and scope, it has maintained affordability for Burlington‘s low-income
residents. Since its beginnings in 1984 through 2002, the BCLT has added 247 units with 97
units changing owners through resale (see Figure 12) and affordability has only increased (the
average BCLT was affordable to a household earning 62% AMI and on resale was affordable to
a household earning 57% AMI).124
Fig. 13: Table of BCLT Unit Portfolio 1984-2002
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The BCLT is only one of 243 operating land trusts in the United States, but not all of
these land trusts experience the same success as what has been seen in Burlington.125 The case
of the land trust in Escambia County, Florida illustrates the obstacles that land trusts must
overcome and, in the case of the ECCLT, are not able to. High operation costs and unbalanced
or unorganized internal structure are issues all land trusts must navigate. However, these issues
can become overwhelming and land trusts can fail to address them and, in turn, fail themselves
especially when corruption influences how these issues are addressed. In 2003, the ECLT was
formed as a non-profit organization aimed at providing affordable housing through
entrepreneurship-centered economic development. The ECLT was formed in response to a
series of studies completed in 2000 that identified five neighborhoods in the city of Pensacola,
Florida as having a ―dire need for affordable housing and jobs.‖126
The first of the ECCLT‘s problems was the structure of the non-profit organization. John
Wyche formed the ECCLT with local entrepreneurs, Marvin Ginns and Oliver Darden. Wyche
served as the head of the organization, overseeing a board varying from five to nine members
mostly chosen by Wyche.127 In addition, the financial activities of the trust were not made
readily available to the public or to the governing board. This structure enabled corruption as the
issue of maintaining the affordability of the land trust intensified. The ECCLT‘s affordable
housing initiative had three components: purchasing a 144 low-income apartment complex,
constructing 35 to 50 single-family homes, and creating a charter school from a local public
school.128 The apartment complex quickly became too expensive to operate (more than $10,000
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per month) and monies designated for the charter school began to be diverted into the affordable
housing projects and, eventually, into projects outside of the land trust—at the direction of
Wyche. After an internal School District audit in 2008, the ECCLT quickly began to dissolve
and today, exists only in name. Although deceit and greed catalyzed the ECCLT‘s failures,
underlying these problems was the inability to overcome problems common to operating a CLT.
With proper oversight, clear internal operating guidelines, realistic vision, and appropriate
funding, CLTs can be successful and should be employed in creating a CLT in Central City.
ST. TAMMANY PARISH: LOUISIANA’S FIRST CLT
On November 6, 2008, the St. Tammany Parish Council approved an ordinance that set
the framework for the creation of a CLT. The ordinance grants the Office of the Parish President
to enter into agreements with local and state agencies that have title to residential properties as
well as with non-profit agencies for the expressed purpose of creating a CLT that is aligned with
the Parish‘s guiding development plan, the Redevelopment and Disposition Plan.129 Through
this authority, St. Tammany Parish identified an existing non-profit agency, the Northshore
Housing Initiative (NHI), to be a CLT. This is the first land trust to be created in the state of
Louisiana and is being used as a tool to help address the growing gap between increased housing
prices and incomes by providing affordable housing.
St. Tammany‘s CLT is newly created and has not begun providing the community with
affordable housing. Although the CLT is very new, being a first for Louisiana, it provides an
opportunity for understanding this relatively obscure affordable housing mechanism. Once St.
Tammany provided the legal framework within the parish to allow for a CLT the first challenge
included forming or finding an organization to serve as the CLT. NHI was an established nonprofit with a mission aimed at providing affordable housing. For these two reasons, with a few
129
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changes to NHI‘s by-laws including a board of directors shaped in the classic CLT model, the
organization was designated the CLT. The next task was to secure funding. So far, funding has
not been an issue as NHI already has an operating budget and St. Tammany has committed
$50,000 for the next three years, however, operating costs for the land trust are nothing as NHI
does not yet operate any affordable housing units.130 The lack of land, however, is a major
obstacle facing NHI.
Originally, NHI was to have land donated to it by the Louisiana Land Trust (LLT). The
lots the LLT decided to donate were largely in the eastern area of St. Tammany Parish—an area
in danger of severe flooding. In response, a deal was struck between the Parish, the NHI, and
the LLT for there to be a public auction of all the lots held by the LLT and that NHI have funds
available to purchase land for its first development.131 The auction is scheduled for July 17th.
NHI is looking to purchase lots located largely in Mandeville due to its second obstacle: concern
that St. Tammany Parish will not embrace the land trust form of ownership.132 Mandeville has
been selected because it has some of the highest land costs in St. Tammany Parish and a working
class population that is finding it increasingly difficult to achieve homeownership. The current
site NHI hopes to attain will accommodate 20-24 units of affordable housing. NHI does not
intend to stay solely in Mandeville, however.
St. Tammany‘s CLT is designed to grow. The CLT is set up to operate in a five parish
area and NHI is already planning on expanding to Tangipahoa Parish in 2011.133 NHI is also
interested in being involved with a CLT in New Orleans. NHI has not articulated the ways in
which it would be involved but is motivated to be involved because of its view that there needs
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to be regional or statewide standards and best practices for all CLTs or there will be renegade
organizations that will impact the reputation and viability of all CLTs.134 NHI has made it clear,
however, that CLTs provide long-term affordability, that it will need community support to have
long-term success, and that it needs financial and regulatory assistance from the government to
begin achieving its affordable housing goals. These lessons are important for a viable CLT to be
created in Central City.
CURRENT EFFORTS: CENTRAL CITY and the LOWER 9th WARD
NORA is familiar with the CLT model and is currently in the process of formulating two
pilot land trusts in New Orleans. The first of these projects is a commercial land trust along the
OC Haley corridor and the other is a housing land trust located in the Lower 9th Ward.135

The

two pilot CLTs are being implemented to explore their viability and reproducibility in New
Orleans.136 The commercial land trust in Central City would not only be the first commercial
land trust in New Orleans, but the first commercial land trust formed in the country. Although
the Central City CLT is for commercial purposes, many of the same issues and questions that
face residential CLTs are arising. A webinar with the National CLT Network identified these
issues: subsidy resources, competition, strategic partnerships, organization structure, staffing
responsibilities, operating revenue, and sustainability.137 The CLT continues to make progress
and some strategic decisions have been made with regards to the commercial focus on ―Main
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Street‖ locations, dedicated to preserving commercial properties, utilizing commercial ground
leasing, and emphasizing businesses stewardship.138
In a presentation by NORA at a Board of Commissioners meeting other decisions were
shared with regards to the commercial CLT: funding was announced to come in part by
recipients of OC Haley corridor revitalization monies in the form of dues to the forming CLT,
the CLT would be set-up to ―reinvest into projects such as acquisition, streetscape, and façade
improvements along the boulevard,‖ and that NORA and other City and community leaders
would appoint an independent seven-member Board of Directors.139 In addition to these
decisions, an organization operating as the CLT, the Crescent City Land Trust, Inc., could be
created as soon as by the end of July 2010.140 Decisions still need to be made about the
population targeted by the CLT and the specific dispersal of benefits between initial participants
and long-term program goals.141
The other pilot CLT is taking place in the Lower 9th Ward. With some changes to the
organizations bylaws, the Neighborhood Empowerment Network Association (NENA) is taking
on the role of the CLT. Housing is relatively already affordable in this area, so the CLT is taking
on a different function: ensuring continued neighborhood control. The CLT is working to curb
speculation, to prevent against absentee tenants and/or landlords, and limit the displacement of
the neighborhood‘s current residents.142 Like the commercial CLT, NENA is still working out
the specifics of how the land trust will balance community and individual benefits. While these
138
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details are worked out, NENA has begun to acquire properties through NORA and is looking to
develop several housing units.
These two pilot projects are just one component of a larger process of bringing the CLT
model to New Orleans. Several municipal agencies, philanthropic agencies, and planning efforts
have expressed an interest in the general concept of CLTs in New Orleans, including the Ford
Foundation, NORA, the CCRA, the Master Plan, and various other community organizations and
municipal agencies. The pilot projects are part of the business planning phase of bringing CLTs
to New Orleans which also includes another component focused on growing the CLT model in
New Orleans. Participants in the business planning phase are exploring growing both residential
and commercial CLTs through grassroots efforts, the public sector, and non-profits.143 The desire
to grow CLTs is an opportunity that could prove the appropriate impetus, in addition to the
existing need for affordable housing in Central City, for NORA to establish a residential CLT in
this neighborhood.
COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS, NORA, AND CENTRAL CITY
Forming a CLT would address many of the shortcomings that face NORA‘s current
strategy. NORA‘s approach potentially creates disparity between the improvement of Central
City and the improvement of the people that live in Central City. The CLT would address this
disconnect in that it creates real benefits from both individuals and the community by preserving
affordability, retaining community wealth, and enhancing residential stability while also
expanding individual homeownership, creating individual wealth, and enabling residential
mobility.144 A CLT would also maintain long-term and diverse affordability.
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Currently NORA only has restrictions for first time homeowners—these restrictions do
not extend to resale transactions. Although first-time homeowners must meet an affordability
criteria based upon a percentage of AMI and agree to occupy the home for at least five years,
there is no restriction on the individual(s) who would potentially purchase this home from the
original homebuyer(s) nor are there any restrictions on what the original homeowner(s) can sell
their property for.145 In addition, the current restriction on first-time homebuyers dictates that
they make 30% of AMI.146 Although this extends affordability to households with very low
incomes, a CLT provides a greater range of affordability by requiring potential homeowners to
have a greater range of incomes, albeit still below a set percentage of AMI.147
Furthermore, the formation of a CLT is in keeping with the city of New Orleans‘ Master
plan. The Master Plan encourages the creation of community based ownership for the purpose of
promoting affordable housing and green space and identifies NORA along with the City
Planning Commission and other unspecified neighborhood groups to lead this initiative.148
There is no lack of rationale for creating a CLT in Central City. There are, however, decisions to
be made with regards to specifics of the CLT as well as obstacles to overcome in following
through with those decisions. Following the framework set forth by the Community Land Trust
Network, decisions need to be made with regards to rational, sponsorship, service area, education
and organizing, development and funding. It is not the recommendation that NORA be the sole
party responsible for creating, implementing, and operating a CLT, but that NORA is one partner
supporting these actions by incorporating a CLT into its strategy for revitalizing Central City.
The table below summarizes the CLT envisioned for Central City.
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Fig. 14: Table of Steps to Form a CLT in Central City

Step
Rational
Sponsorship
Service Area

Organization
and Education

Development
Funding

Application in Central City
Developing communities without displacing people.
NORA would work closely with an identified existing non-profit that would
eventually take on the operations of the CLT such as the Central City
Housing Development Corporation.
Focus initially on Central City, however, leave room for growth or for
partnering with other non-profits in other neighborhoods. The issue of
affordable housing is not unique to Central City and the implementation of a
CLT may prove to be a model worth replicating. In addition, NORA has
similarly vested interests in neighborhoods throughout New Orleans as it
does in Central City.
Core Group organizing will expedite the formation of a CLT, increase the
CLT‘s credibility, and borrowing capacity. NORA, neighborhood
organizations including the CCRA and OC Haley Merchants Association,
consultants from Burlington Associates, non-profit developers (GCHP), city
planning department official, and city council representatives would
comprise the core group.
The CLT would likely adopt the municipally-initiated project strategy
developing parcels made available to it through NORA. The CLT could also
allow for some of the parcels to be developed as market-rate units if desired.
Funding could come from untapped state and federal resources. Initial costs
may be minimized if NORA donated properties and using an existing nonprofit.

The rational for a CLT in Central City has been echoed throughout this thesis. Given
NORA‘s existing mission and on-going strategy in Central City, the rationale of a CLT initiated
by NORA would target a diverse population with regards to income and would emphasize the
need to revitalize the area, not just develop affordable housing. In short, NORA would be
seeking balance between developing Central City and retaining current residents by providing
adequate and long-term affordable housing options.
The neighborhood size CLT would be most appropriate for NORA‘s goals as it would
complement the current targeting strategy already occurring in the Central City neighborhood.
However, NORA should consider expanding from Central City as it has properties all over New
Orleans and affordable housing is a city-wide issue particularly if there are existing CLTs
56

seeking to work within New Orleans, such as NHI. Traditionally, CLTs have focused on one
neighborhood. These CLTs make up 25% of all CLTs in operation today.149 CLTs can focus on
geographic areas that extend to an entire metropolitan area or even to a region (as large as one or
several counties). Larger geographic areas are most appropriate for more rural place, but for
urban settings there are many advantages for a CLT to focus its mission on a single or a few
neighborhoods. Benefits of this smaller focus include a lower cost of operation, a commitment
to neighborhood revitalization, and increased landlord presence, among others.150
Although NORA could potentially serve as the CLT, government agencies infrequently
take on this role. Non-profit organizations make up most CLTs because the agency is able to
focus on a charitable purpose and has access to a wide range of funding sources, among other
advantages. In light of this, NORA‘s role in the formation of the CLT will be both significant
and unique, but not serving as the CLT. NORA‘s obligation to both eradicate blight and return
properties back to the city‘s payrolls makes a CLT a natural option for the organization to
pursue. NORA has control over thousands of blighted properties it needs to have put back into
commerce. The CLT is in need of property and would put these properties back into commerce.
A reciprocating relationship between the CLT and NORA could include NORA selling or
donating properties it controls in Central City to the CLT. Many CLTs do not have properties
that sit adjacent to each other, rather the properties are located randomly in a defined geographic
area, such as the size of Central City. Thus, NORA would have flexibility in deciding which
properties the agency would like to give to the CLT to make it the most viable and which
properties it would like to keep for future redevelopment plans. The creation of a residential
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CLT is not just a great opportunity for Central City, it is a great opportunity for NORA. To
further ensure that NORA also benefited in its relationship with the CLT, NORA would sit on
the board of the CLT and would have oversight in seeing that properties were rehabilitated and
put back into commerce.
Development is a significant obstacle for creating a successful CLT in Central City.
Ideally, NORA would donate properties it holds title to in Central City to the CLT. The CLT
would, in turn, develop the property or seek out another non-profit developer, such as GCHP
with experience in the area, who would rehabilitate the property or even build something new at
which point the CLT would ensure the long-term affordability of the parcel. The issue of
internal conflict arises when considering that the properties controlled by NORA in Central City,
should property values continue to increase, could become very valuable pieces of property that
could be sold at market-rates. Choosing to make available its resources to the CLT, namely with
regards to providing the CLT with parcels of land in Central City, could prove to be in direct
conflict with NORA‘s future interests with these properties. The types, condition, and price of
properties NORA would potentially donate or sell to the CLT would need careful consideration.
Funding remains a formidable challenge in formulating successful CLTs. Money is not
only needed to acquire land and properties, it is also needed to repair and maintain properties, a
particularly expensive task given the widespread blight in Central City. In addition, CLTs
generally take at least three years to become financially sustainable and often CLTs require
continued outside funding depending on its affordability goals.151 However, even if NORA or
the designated non-profit cannot financially contribute to the CLT, funding sources do exist that
could potentially sustain the CLT.
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In response to the impact of mortgage foreclosures and declining property values in much
of the country, Congress has appropriated $3.92 billion under the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 in US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) monies.152 HUD has developed the
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) and the procedures for allocating monies to the
states and communities with the main focus of this program to return abandoned or foreclosed
homes back into commerce. HUD has allocated $34,183,994 in grant funds to the State of
Louisiana and the Louisiana Office of Community Development (OCD) will receive the
allocated grand funds.153 The OCD has designated the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency
(LFHA) as the lead agency in distributing and monitoring the expenditures of these funds
Fig. 15: Maps of Target Areas with Foreclosure risk
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according to the guidelines outlined by HERA. Pre-applications have been received, and
Request for Proposals have been submitted and 23 grantees determined in April 2009.154
Given the intent of the NSP and the limited resources for this program, it has been
determined it is in the best interest to designate a small area of concentrated need as the area of
greatest need—a targeting strategy. The Central City neighborhood is one of four areas that have
been targeted to receive a portion of NSP monies (see Figure 15). Funding is to be spent on
eleven projects listed below, including a program specifically focused on creating land banks
(see Figure 16).

Orleans Parish has been designated $2,302,208 for implementing appropriate

NSP programs and has awarded the money to four entities (see Figure 17).155
Finding funding to initiate a land bank is a serious impediment. However, $467,074 of
the Orleans Parish NSP monies has not been spent and, as of September 30, 2009, none of the
$2,000,000 in state funding earmarked for Land Banking Assistance has been spent.156 This
money may provide some of the funding needed to form a land bank in Central City. Although it
is not known how much money would be required to begin a land trust, some of the costs of
pursuing this affordable housing in Central City may be frayed due to NORA‘s current
ownership of at least 75 properties in Central City. Thus, money would not be needed for
property acquisition, but for maintenance and property improvements and subsidizing the cost of
the homes to make them affordable to lower-income residents.
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Fig. 16: Table of NSP Funded Projects

Project #
301
400
BCKT
200
500
201
101
100
300
9999
600

Project Title
Rental Housing Development
Land Banking Assistance
Bucket Project
Homeownership Development
Homebuyer Counseling
Homehowernship—120% AMI or Below
LHFA‘s Administration
OCD Administration
Rental—25% Set Aside 50% AMI or Below
Restricted Balance
Homebuyer Bond Program

Source: State of Louisiana Division of Administration. Jul 1, 2009
thru Sep 30, 2009 Performance Report.
<http://www.doa.louisiana.gov/cdbg/DR/NSP/July_Sept%202009%2
04YQ.pdf>
Fig. 17: Table of LHFA Awardees and Award Amounts

Grantee

Amount Awarded

Gulf Coast Housing Partnership
RD‐15

$500,000

Enterprise Corporation HD‐13

$1,078,000

New Orleans Neighborhood
Development Collaborative
HD‐21

$217,134

Neighborhood Housing Service
HB‐02

$40,000

Source: Louisiana Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP)
Recommended Awards 2009 Summary.
<http://www.lhfa.louisiana.gov/downloads/neighborhoodStabilization
/NSPProceduresforAllocationofFundsAttachmentB2009NSPAwards_
040909.pdf>
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS
CONCLUSIONS
NORA‘s strategy and the more general trend of neighborhood revitalization rely on the
infusion of investment into a defined and relatively contained geographical area to, in turn, spur
additional investment from the private market and other sources. This strategy makes sensible
use of limited resources, but is not without its weaknesses and negative effects. However, there
are methods of addressing these weaknesses and negative effects especially if the impacts can be
anticipated and planning is proactive. In the case of NORA and the OC Haley corridor and
Central City neighborhood, the neighborhood is attracting addition investment and will continue
to do so. However, there are few safeguards in place to counteract the negative effects of
gentrification and protect the general affordability of the area. For this reason, the NORA
strategy does not need to be overhauled or severely changed, but should incorporate an
additional component in the form of aiding in the creation and operation of an affordable housing
Community Land Trust in Central City.
Affordable housing and economic development are sorely needed in Central City. Prior
to Hurricane Katrina the community and planners had expressed a need to address these issues in
Central City. This has not changed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and, in many ways, the
need has intensified particularly with regards to affordable housing. Affordability has decreased
since the 2005 storm, city-wide as well as nation-wide. New Orleanians pay greater percentages
of their incomes for decent housing and resident incomes in Central City are approximately half
that of the average income in New Orleans, making Central City residents even more vulnerable
to the affordable housing crisis. In addition, the area has also suffered from the absence of
economic activity on its once prosperous commercial corridor, OC Haley Boulevard. The
progression of planning efforts, however, in response to Hurricane Katrina has tended towards
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prioritizing the economic revitalization of the city over that of housing recovery—particularly
that of low-income housing. Regardless of whether this focus is ethical or moral, it is
economical and, although that fact may be unfortunate, it is the reality with which New Orleans
must recover. NORA, a city agency, has adopted the recovery priorities and has developed a
complimentary strategy shaped by its limitations and executed through its unique authorities.
NORAs seeming focus on economic development does not need to exclude the
simultaneous development of affordable housing. NORA can effectively accomplish its
economic revitalization of Central City while also ensuring greater affordability for residents
through initiating the creation of a CLT. The goals of a land trust accomplishes many of the
goals NORA is working towards in Central City including blight remediation, providing longterm affordable housing options, and returning properties to commerce. Although there is much
work to do to make a CLT in Central City a reality, many of the obstacles that hinder CLT
success are perhaps not so threatening in this particular case. Funding sources appear available
and several properties are already owned. In addition, the area is becoming increasingly
attractive to outside interests and current residents have little control over their community—
these are some of the conditions that make CLTs an appropriate and successful option for
providing affordable housing.
A CLT is a long-term investment in Central City and its residents. A CLT will require
continued oversight and continued investment, but can also create continued affordability,
continued empowerment of residents, and continued economic growth. Should the investments
NORA is making and seeking have the intended effects on OC Haley and Central City, property
values will rise and the area will become more expensive. The secondary effects of this will
provide added support of local businesses and community facilities, it may help to improve the

63

local schools, and may even aid in the decrease of crime. However it will also likely lead to the
pushing out of current residents—residents that have endured the disinvestment in their
community and should now benefit from its revitalization. A CLT can help ensure that the
brighter future of Central City is something that is not determined by income bracket, but by the
desire to take part in the revitalization of this unique and important New Orleans neighborhood.

AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As mentioned before, the actual outcomes of NORA‘s strategy are largely unknown as
the strategy is in the early stages of implementation. This does not mean that likely outcomes
cannot be predicted or that NORA should not consider additional strategies for troubleshooting
likely negative effects or problems with its current course of action. However, there is room for
future research. Future research should continue as the strategy progresses, once it has been
completed, and in the years following its completion. Specifically, research examining the
demographic composition of the neighborhood and the overall affordability of the area would be
appropriate and very telling as to the impacts NORA‘s targeting strategy and any other strategy
implemented in the future as related to Central City. Following Galster‘s, etal. approach, the
adjusted interrupted time series model, on their study of Richmond, Virginia would be one way
to measure the consequences of targeting as this model ―compare[s] differences in levels and
trends of an outcome indicator between target and control neighborhoods before and after the
intervention, while controlling for coincident citywide changes in trends.‖157 This is a current
limitation of this thesis as the redevelopment of Central City is in the very early stages of
implementation. Other valuable research would include evaluating community sentiments and
perceptions of NORA‘s actions. It is unclear how the community views what NORA is doing in
157
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their neighborhood or how NORA is doing this in neighborhood. An understanding of
community opinion may clarify the effects of NORA‘s strategy as there are a variety of reasons
people may leave an area—not just that they are pushed out by increased property values.
Although further research is needed, whether rooted in quantifiable measures or qualitative
discussions will provide greater clarity as to the future direction of Central City, there are already
some important implications taking shape.
New Orleans, since Hurricane Katrina, has become, as a whole, wealthier, younger, and
whiter.158 This trend diverges greatly from what Central City has historically been and what it
has become since Hurricane Katrina. Demographic changes in themselves are not necessarily
good or bad, however, they can be an indicator of a greater movement, of larger forces at work,
and can have very negative implications for certain populations. Given the history of Central
City, the state of affordable housing, the current demographic trend of New Orleans, there is
reason for concern that Central City will experience a demographic change as an effect not of
personal choice, but of economic coercion. Regardless of race, socioeconomic class, household
composition, or education level, residents of Central City and residents of New Orleans, should
have the ability to remain in their communities, especially if their communities are being
improved by federal monies. Furthermore, as a public entity, charged with encouraging both
economic development and affordable housing, NORA has the obligation to actively protect the
interests of Central City residents on both fronts. To allow NORA‘s current strategy which
embraces only one of its obligations would allow the organization to be remiss in its public
duties and set a standard that communicates the importance of economic development over
access to improved areas.
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APPENDIX

Appendix A:Table of comparing level of schooling between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the US

Level of schooling (2000)
Total population 18 years and
over

Orleans
Central City Parish Louisiana

United
States

13,396 355,507 3,250,523 209,279,149

Less than 9th grade

12.5%

7.2%

8.4%

7.1%

9th to 12th grade, no diploma

31.4%

18.2%

17.2%

13.2%

High school diploma or GED

26.2%

24.0%

32.0%

28.6%

Some college or Associate
degree

18.3%

27.5%

25.6%

28.8%

Bachelor's degree to higher

11.6%

23.1%

16.8%

22.3%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 FullCount Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
<http://www.gnocdc.org>

Appendix B:Table of comparing average household income between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and
the US

Average household income
(2000)
Average household income

Orleans
Parish Louisiana

United
States

$23,237 $43,176 $44,833

$56,644

Central City

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 FullCount Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
<http://www.gnocdc.org>
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Appendix C: comparing pop. in poverty between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the US

Population in poverty (2000)

Central
City

Orleans
Parish Louisiana

United
States

Total population for whom poverty
status is determined

18,993 468,453 4,334,094

273,882,232

People living in poverty

49.8%

27.9%

19.6%

12.4%

People living at or above poverty

50.2%

72.1%

80.4%

87.6%

1,677

39,308

375,393

22,636,650

Children 0-5 living in poverty

75.2%

43.0%

29.0%

18.1%

Children 0-5 living at or above
poverty

24.8%

57.0%

71.0%

81.9%

2,046

44,048

403,616

24,587,815

Children 6-11 living in poverty

67.5%

42.4%

26.8%

16.9%

Children 6-11 living at or above
poverty

32.5%

57.6%

73.2%

83.1%

1,876

44,210

421,352

23,700,796

Children 12-17 living in poverty

54.7%

36.5%

24.4%

14.8%

Children 12-17 living at or above
poverty

45.3%

63.5%

75.6%

85.2%

11,022 286,783 2,644,159

169,610,423

Total population 0-5 for whom
poverty status is determined

Total population 6-11 for whom
poverty status is determined

Total population 12-17 for whom
poverty status is determined

Total population 18-64 for whom
poverty status is determined
Adults 18-64 living in poverty

44.0%

24.0%

17.0%

11.1%

Adults 18-64 living at or above
poverty

56.0%

76.0%

83.0%

88.9%

Total population 65 and older for
whom poverty status is determined

2,372

54,104

489,574

33,346,548

Adults 65 and older living in
poverty (%)

39.4%

19.3%

16.7%

9.9%

Adults 65 and older living at or
above poverty (%)

60.6%

80.7%

83.3%

90.1%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 FullCount Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
<http://www.gnocdc.org>
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Appendix D:Table of comparing racial & ethnic diversity between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the
US

Racial & ethnic diversity (2000)
Black or African American

Orleans
Central City Parish Louisiana

United
States

87.1%

66.6%

32.3%

12.1%

White

9.9%

26.6%

62.6%

69.2%

Asian

0.6%

2.3%

1.2%

3.6%

American Indian

0.1%

0.2%

0.5%

0.7%

Other

0.0%

0.2%

0.1%

0.3%

2 race categories

0.7%

1.0%

0.9%

1.6%

Hispanic (any race)

1.6%

3.1%

2.4%

12.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 FullCount Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
<http://www.gnocdc.org>

Appendix E:Table of comparing household type between Central City, Orleans Parish, LA, and the US

Households by type (2000)
Total households
Female householder (no husband
present) with children under 18

Central Orleans
City Parish Louisiana

United
States

8,147 188,251 1,656,053 105,480,101
24.0%

17.7%

11.9%

8.4%

Male householder (no wife present)
with children under 18

2.5%

2.5%

2.6%

2.4%

Married-couple family, with
children under 18

5.5%

14.8%

24.3%

24.9%

Nonfamily households, with
children under 18

0.5%

0.3%

0.4%

0.4%

Households with no people under 18
years
67.5% 64.7%
60.8%
63.9%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census 2000 Sample Characteristics (SF3) and Census2000 FullCount Characteristics (SF1). From a compilation by the GNO Community Data Center.
<http://www.gnocdc.org>
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Appendix F:

Households Actively Receiving Mail by Neighborhood in New Orleans (Algiers Point
through City Park)

Neighborhood
Algiers Point
Audubon
B.W. Cooper
Bayou St. John
Behrman
Black Pearl
Broadmoor
Bywater
Central Business District
Central City
City Park

June
2005
1,322
7,576
1,269
2,292
3,878
1,115
3,139
2,570
1,316
8,175
1,670

% Recovery
June 2008
102%
97%
28%
84%
95%
99%
81%
81%
120%
78%
92%

June 2008
1,351
7,344
357
1,921
3,697
1,107
2,551
2,091
1,585
6,405
1,534
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June 2009
1,417
7,292
345
1,976
3,832
1,082
2,324
2,165
1,939
6,233
1,585

% Recovery
June 2009
107%
96%
27%
86%
99%
97%
74%
84%
147%
76%
95%

Appendix G: Table of affordable housing strategies implemented in New
Orleans

Affordable Housing
Strategy
Public Housing Units

Tenant-Based Vouchers

Low Income Housing
Tax Credits (LITHC)

Small Rental Property
Program

Subsidized Housing

Affordable Housing Strategy Description
Rental apartments supported by federal public housing operating
subsidies. To be eligible, tenants must have incomes at or below
80% of area median income. Many have very low incomes; Tenantbased vouchers
Federal rental subsidies, administered by a public housing authority,
for units that tenants choose in the private market. This category
includes the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher and post-Katrina
DHAP voucher programs. To be eligible, households must have
incomes at or below 80% of area median income. However, federal
law gives priority to households with incomes at or below 30% of
area median income; HUD project-based rental assistance – HUD
agreements with owners of multifamily apartment complexes to pay
the difference between the approved rent and what the tenant can
afford. To be eligible, tenants must have incomes at or below 80% of
area median income. Nationwide, two-thirds of the households in
these units are elderly and disabled. Many have very low incomes.
Federal income tax credits administered by the Internal Revenue
Service and awarded to developers by the Louisiana Housing
Finance Agency. Developers typically sell the credits to raise equity
capital for their projects. The tax credits may be claimed annually
for 10 years against eligible development costs for units restricted to
low-income households. The units are generally affordable to
households with incomes between 45% and 60% of area median
income. Federal tax law requires the owner to comply with rent and
income restrictions on designated units for 30 years after they are
made available for occupancy. GO Zone Housing Tax Credits are a
form of low income housing tax credits.
A rental housing initiative, formulated by the Louisiana Recovery
Authority and the state Office of Community Development, that uses
CDBG funds to provide forgivable loans to landlords for the repair
of hurricane-damaged small rental properties, primarily those with
one to four units. In return for financing, landlords must comply for
5 to 10 years (longer for nonprofits) with certain tenant income and
rent restrictions. Depending on the level of CDBG assistance, the
landlord sets maximum rents per restricted unit at levels affordable
to households earning 50%, 65% or 80% of area median income
Rental units with tenant income, and in some cases rent, restrictions
imposed by the above programs; Subsidized households refer to the
households that occupy those units

Source: Plyer, Alison. et. al. ―Housing Production Needs: Three Scenarios for New Orleans.‖ Greater
New Orleans Community data Center and The Urban Institute. November 2009.
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